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CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
“SAFETY VALVE” PROVISION AS APPLIED TO 
THE MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT 
– ALEXANDER AND MOSQUERA-MURILLO 
Alexander D. Andruzzi1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the passage of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(MDLEA) in 1986, drug traffickers intercepted on the high seas have been 
prosecuted in United States district courts.2 Many cases prosecuted under 
the MDLEA in United States district courts have nearly identical facts: the 
United States Coast Guard apprehends a foreign national on a suspicious 
vessel on the high seas carrying large quantities of drugs.3 Until recently, 
circuit courts have been consistent in upholding a district court’s denial of 
“safety valve”4 relief to defendants charged under the MDLEA.5 However, 
a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has created a circuit split regarding the applicability of “safety 
valve” relief to defendants charged under the MDLEA.6 Furthermore, a 
petition for certiorari was submitted requesting that the Court resolve the 
newly-created circuit split.7  
This Note will compare a recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit 
dealing with the applicability of the “safety valve” provision, United States 
v. Alexander, to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mosquera-
Murillo. Additionally, this Note will assert that the petition for cert. should 
                                            
 1.  J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maine School of Law. 
 2.  Lieutenant Commander Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug 
Law Enforcement Act: A Justification for the Law's Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV. NAT'L 
SEC. J. 191, 195 (2017). 
 3.  See generally, United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas. 508 F.3d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 4.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2012) (“Safety valve” relief provides a limitation on the 
application of statutory minimum sentences. This provision will be discussed in depth in 
the section entitled “X”). 
 5.  See United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d at 494.  
 6.  See United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 287 (C.A.D.C. 2018). 
 7.  Castillo v. United States, No. 18-374, 2018 WL 4564803, **2-3 (11th Cir. 2018), 
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 21, 2018).  
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be granted and that the Supreme Court should affirm the D.C. Circuit’s 
Mosquera-Murillo decision.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Under the Define and Punish Clause of the United States Constitution, 
Congress has the power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”8 
Since the 1970s, Congress has used this power to promote the interdiction 
of vessels on the high seas attempting to smuggle narcotics into the United 
States.9 In particular, United States counterdrug operations focus on three 
geographic areas: (1) Source Zone (supplier countries in South America); 
(2) Transit Zone (a 7 million square mile area between source countries in 
South America and Arrival Zone in North America); and (3) Arrival Zone 
(area where narcotics arrive in United States and Canada).10 For the 
transportation of narcotics from the Source Zone to the Arrival Zone, 
criminal organizations have long “recognize[d] the oceans as critical 
routes, given the anonymity a ship enjoys over large, ungoverned stretches 
of space, the relative complexities in jurisdiction, and the limited capacity 
of most countries' coastal law enforcement.”11 The use of the Transit Zone 
by criminal organizations for the transportation of narcotics into the 
United States is substantial.12 For example, in the fiscal year of 2017, the 
Coast Guard “removed 223.8 metric tons of cocaine from the Transit Zone 
. . . .”13  
In order to combat the smuggling of narcotics through the Transit 
Zone and expand the scope of interdiction efforts, Congress passed the 
MDLEA, codified as 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508.14 The MDLEA provides, 
in relevant part, that an individual is prohibited from “manufactur[ing] or 
distribut[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to manufacture or distribute, a 
controlled substance”15 while the individual is “on board a covered 
                                            
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
 9.  Mary B. Neumayr, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 488 (1988) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1980)). 
 10.  Casavant, supra note 2, at 197-98. 
 11.  Brian Wilson, Submersibles and Transnational Criminal Organizations, 17 OCEAN 
& COASTAL L.J. 35, 39 (2011). 
 12.  Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Review of U.S. 
Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report, 2-3 (2018). 
 13.  Id. at 3.  
 14.  See Neumayr, supra note 9, at488-92; 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508 (2018). 
 15.  46 U.S.C.A. § 70503(a)(1) (2016). 
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vessel.”16 A “covered vessel” is defined as “a vessel of the United States 
or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”17 or “any other 
vessel if the individual is a citizen of the United States or a resident alien 
of the United States.”18 The language “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States” affords United States law enforcement, namely the 
Coast Guard,19 the ability to police “stateless vessels.”20 This provision has 
been controversial; with some commentators arguing that this language 
creates an overbroad grant of authority for United States law enforcement 
and others contend that it is necessary to effectively stem the tide of 
narcotics into the United States.21 
A. Safety-valve Relief 
 In 1990, Congress ordered the United States Sentencing Commission 
to study the impact of mandatory minimums on the sentencing 
guidelines.22 Ultimately, the House Judiciary Committee “characterized 
the resulting report as concluding that ‘by limiting the effect of mitigating 
factors, mandatory minimums did in some cases lead to instances in which 
offenders who markedly differed in seriousness nonetheless received 
similarly severe sentences.’” 23 In the wake of this finding, Congress 
enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.24  
  Primarily concerned with the sentencing of nonviolent drug 
offenders, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act applies to 
particular offenses charged under the Controlled Substances Act25 and the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (CSIEA).26  The CSIEA is 
the statute at issue in cases charged under the MDLEA.27 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(f) provides, in relevant part, that “the court shall impose a sentence 
pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing 
                                            
 16.  Id. 
 17.  § 70503(e)(1)  
 18.  § 70503(e)(2)   
 19.  Department of Homeland Security, supra note 12, at 2.  
 20.  46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1) (2018). 
 21.  See generally Casavant, supra note 2; Elaina Aquila, Courts Have Gone Overboard 
in Applying the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 2965 (2018). 
 22.  Hutchison et. al, Authors’ Comments, Limitation on Applicability of Statutory 
Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases, Fed. Sent. L. & Prac. § 5C1.2 (2009 ed.). 
 23.  Id. at 3.  
 24.  Id. at 10.  
 25.  21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844, 846 (2018). 
 26.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018); the Controlled Substances and Import and Export Act 
is codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 960, 963 (2018). 
 27.  See United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 292-93 (C.A.D.C. 2018). 
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Commission . . . without regard to any statutory minimum sentence,” if 
five factors are present.28 The factors are as follows: 
(1) The defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history 
point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (2) the 
defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or 
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 
participant to do so) in connection with the offense; (3) the offense 
did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) 
the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor 
of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing 
guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances 
Act; and (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all 
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the 
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct 
or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has 
no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude 
a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with 
this requirement.29 
There are two ways the “safety valve” provision may potentially 
benefit a defendant who satisfies the enumerated factors.30 “First, a 
defendant can receive a guideline sentence of less than the mandatory 
minimum.”31 Additionally, “the sentencing court, without regard to [a] . . 
. defendant’s guideline range, can depart to a sentence below the 
mandatory minimum if there is a basis for the departure and the extent to 
the departure is reasonable.”32 The two cases in this Note, United States v. 
Mosquera-Murillo and United States v. Alexander, deal with defendants 
asserting a denial of the first benefit.33 
                                            
 28.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); id. at 292. 
 29.  § 3553(f). 
 30.  Hutchison, supra note 22.  
 31.  Id.   
 32.  Id.  
 33.  United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 288 (C.A.D.C. 2018); United 
States v. Alexander, 713 F. App’x 919, 921 (11th Cir. 2017).  
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B. Alexander Factual Background 
United States Coast Guard cutter34 Richard Dixon intercepted a 
suspicious vessel that was traveling in international waters approximately 
seventy nautical miles35 south of the Dominican Republic.36 The 
suspicious vessel did not identify its nationality.37 When a chase boat was 
launched from the Richard Dixon, the suspicious vessel attempted to flee 
and one of the occupants of the vessel “fell or jumped overboard during 
the pursuit.”38 This individual was later identified as Desmond 
Alexander.39 Once the Coast Guard secured the vessel and apprehended 
Alexander, the bales of marijuana were brought to Miami where the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA)  weighed them and determined that 
the amountonboard was approximately 1,251 kilograms.40 Alexander was 
charged and convicted under the MDLEA and sentenced to the mandatory 
minimum of 120 months imprisonment.41 
On appeal at the Eleventh Circuit, Alexander challenged his 
conviction on four grounds.42 First, Alexander contended that the 
“government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense 
involved 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana.”43 Second, Alexander 
alleged that “the government’s use of his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and against self-
incrimination.”44 Third, Alexander argued that the MDLEA was 
unconstitutional as applied to him.45 Finally, Alexander argued that “his 
sentence should be vacated because . . . denying safety-valve relief to 
                                            
 34.  Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, The Cutters, Boats, 
and Aircraft of the U.S. Coast Guard 130, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents
/CG_Cutters-Boats-Aircraft_2015-2016_edition.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-092150-230 
[https://perma.cc/TL2X-95QT] (A “cutter” is “a Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or 
greater, with accommodations for a crew to live aboard”). 
 35.  United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration, What is the difference between a nautical mile and a knot?, 
(June 15, 2018), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/nauticalmile_knot.html [https://
perma.cc/N8HC-UFCM] (stating that a nautical mile is equal to approximately 1.15 land-
measured miles). 
 36.  Alexander, 713 F. App’x. at 921. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 922. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 922. 
 42.  Id. at 923. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 926.  
 45.  Id.  
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defendants convicted under the MDLEA violates equal protection.”46 The 
Eleventh Circuit upheld Alexander’s conviction and sentence.47 
In denying the defendant safety-valve relief, the Eleventh Circuit 
turned to its 2012 decision in United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz.48 
Specifically, the Court noted that Pertuz-Pertuz, “explained that, by its 
terms, the safety valve applies only to convictions under the five listed 
statutes – 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846, 960, and 963.”49 The Court 
concluded that “the express selection of five statutes reflects an intent to 
exclude others”50 and 46 U.S.C. § 70503 does not qualify for safety-valve 
relief.51 Alexander’s Equal Protection challenge was rooted in the 
presumption that “geography alone is not a good enough reason to exclude 
MDLEA defendants from the safety valve.”52 The Court, however, found 
this argument unpersuasive and sided with the government that Alexander 
failed to show plain error.53 
C. Mosquera-Murillo Factual Background  
The facts of Mosquera-Murillo are remarkably similar. In the 
Mosquera-Murillo case, a United States Coast Guard cutter spotted a fast 
moving, suspicious vessel approximately seventy nautical miles off the 
coast of Panama.54 When the cutter approached the suspicious vessel, “the 
Mistby fled, and its crew began to dump cargo overboard.”55 The Coast 
Guard was able to  overtake the Mistby, board it, and determined that it 
was a vessel of Colombian nationality.56 With permission from the 
                                            
 46.  Id. at 927.  
 47.  Id. at 928.  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. at 927, n. 4. (The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the MDLEA 
for plain error rather than de novo because Alexander “did not raise this specific issue 
before the district court.” Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by 
Alexander’s argument that de novo review should apply because the district court failed to 
provide an opportunity, after the sentence was imposed, to object to the Court’s “findings 
of fact and conclusions of law,” in violation of United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 
(11th Cir. 1990)). 
 54.  United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 287  (C.A.D.C. 2018). 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.  
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Colombian Navy,57 the Coast Guard arrested the Mistby’s crew and 
searched the vessel, eventually uncovering large quantities of cocaine.58 
Mosquera-Murillo pled guilty to violating the MDLEA and was sentenced 
to 120 months imprisonment.59 
 On appeal, the Mosquera-Murillo defendants challenged their 
conviction and sentence on two grounds.60 First, defendants argued that 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cases.61 
Second, the defendants argued that the offense charged under the MDLEA 
was eligible for safety-valve relief.62 However, unlike in Alexander,  
Mosquera-Murillo challenged the application of the safety-valve on 
statutory grounds – claiming that a conviction under the MDLEA 
constitutes “‘an offense under’ § 960 within the meaning of the safety-
valve provision.”63 This challenge necessitated statutory interpretation.64  
 To begin, the D.C. Circuit examined the source of the penalties for 
offenses under the MDLEA, which is 21 U.S.C. § 960.65 The Court 
explained that “[o]ffenses are defined by the provisions that supply their 
elements.”66 For offenses under the MDLEA, the conduct elements of the 
offenses are defined in 46 U.S.C. § 70503. In Mosquera-Murillo’s case, 
the D.C. Circuit interpreted the elements as “(i) conspiring, (ii) to 
intentionally or knowingly, (iii) distribute or possess with intent to 
distribute, (iv) a controlled substance, (v) while on board a vessel.”67 Yet, 
the offense elements “of drug-type and drug-quantity . . . which bear on 
the degree of culpability and determine the statutory sentencing range” are 
enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 960.68 Thus, since violations of the MDLEA 
necessarily draw certain offense elements from 21 U.S.C. § 960 – one of 
the crimes explicitly enumerated as qualifying for safety-valve relief – 
“the defendants’ crime is ‘an offense under’ both the MDLEA and § 
960.”69 
                                            
 57.  Id. (citing Agreement to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, Colom.-U.S., art. 2, Feb. 
20, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12,835.) (The United States and Colombia “have agreed by treaty 
to ‘cooperate in combating illicit traffic by sea.’”).  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 288. 
 60.  Id. at 289. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 292; Cf. United States v. Alexander, 713 F. App’x. 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2017).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 293 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)). 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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 In support of its determination that violations of the MDLEA also 
constitute “offenses under” § 960, the Court turned to Apprendi v. New 
Jersey.70 Specifically, the Court in Mosquera-Murillo noted that “any fact 
that increases the prescribed statutory maximum penalty to which a 
defendant is exposed amounts to an offense element that must be 
submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”71 In cases 
charged under the MDLEA, the drug-type and drug-quantity elements 
supplied by § 960 impact the maximum sentence and thus qualify as 
“offense elements” under the rule set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Apprendi.72  
 The Government, in response, asserted that since there are no 
MDLEA offenses under § 960(a), convictions under the MDLEA do not 
qualify as “offenses” under § 960 “within the meaning of the safety-valve 
provision.”73 The Government contended that only offenses enumerated in 
§ 960(a), and “not other offenses defined in part by drug-type and drug-
quantity elements set out in § 960(b),” constitute offenses entitled to 
safety-valve relief.74 The Court found the government’s argument 
unpersuasive.75 
 In response to the government’s contentions, the Court determined 
that rather than laying out elements of criminal offense, § 960(a) “merely 
lists certain offenses established elsewhere in the code,” in order to 
“identify a set of offenses for which § 960(b) supplies the drug-type and 
drug-quantity elements, and, accordingly, the range of potential 
penalties.”76 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit concluded:  
[i]f both the offenses listed in § 960(a) and the relevant offenses 
under the MDLEA as (i) established outside of § 960, and (ii) 
make use of the drug-type and drug-quantity elements and 
associated penalties set forth in § 960(b), then there is no reason 
to conclude . . . that the former qualify as “offenses under” § 960 
for purpose of safety-valve eligibility whereas the latter do not.77 
The D.C. Circuit, however, did not stop its analysis with statutory 
interpretation of § 960(a) and the MDLEA.78 Rather, the Court looked to 
                                            
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 294. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 295. 
 78.  Id.  
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the legislative history of both the MDLEA and 21 U.S.C. § 955, its 
counterpart for offenses committed “via the customs waters of the United 
States.”79 The Court also noted the “century-long pattern of identical 
penalties for drug offenses committed in domestic waters and on the high 
seas”80 and concluded that Congress did not intend to break “its 100-year 
pattern of penalty parity” by allowing offenders of § 955 to qualify for 
safety-valve relief, but not offenders of the MDLEA.81 
D. Petition for Cert. 
 In light of the recent circuit split created by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision in United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, a petition for writ 
of certiorari was submitted to the United States Supreme Court in the case 
of United States v. Castillo.82 This Note argues that the petition for cert. 
should be granted to resolve the circuit split.  
 Although granting a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve an issue 
related to sentencing guidelines was rare last term,83 the Court should 
nevertheless grant the petition on this matter. Rule 10 of the Supreme 
Court Rules explains that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari will be 
granted only for compelling reasons.”84 While granting a petition is “not a 
matter of right,” but one of discretion, the issues presented by the current 
circuit split fit squarely within the “character of the reasons the Court 
considers.”85 Specifically, the circuit split is “on the same important 
matter.”86 When addressing the application of the safety-valve provision 
to offenses charged under the MDLEA, the Eleventh Circuit in Alexander 
relied on its earlier precedent to conclude that because the MDLEA is not 
listed as an “offense under § 960,” defendants are not entitled to safety-
valve relief.87 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of “offense 
under § 960,” is in direct conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation in 
Mosquera-Murillo.88 
                                            
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 83.  The Supreme Court 2016 Term, The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 415 (2017) 
(finding that of the nine federal criminal cases granted cert., only one was related to 
“Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
 84.  U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  United States v. Alexander, 713 F. App’x 919,  928 (11th Cir. 2017).  
 88.  United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 292 (C.A.D.C. 2018). 
260 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:2 
 
 In addition to the circuit split being “on the same important matter,” 
the split will not be resolved without Supreme Court review.89 This split 
presents a compelling reason for the Court to grant certiorari in this 
instance given the importance of the issue: disparate sentencing for 
defendants based on the Circuit in which they are tried.90 Based on these 
characteristics, this Note urges the Supreme Court to grant the petition for 
writ of certiorari.  
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 Current jurisprudence has left a circuit split of three-to-one with the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits holding that defendants charged under 
the MDLEA are not entitled to safety-valve relief91 and with the D.C. 
Circuit holding that defendants are eligible.92 Although the split is three-
to-one in favor of denying safety-valve relief to otherwise eligible 
defendants charged under the MDLEA, the D.C. Circuit’s approach to 
determining whether or not the MDLEA constitutes an “offense under § 
960” is the correct approach. In concluding that otherwise eligible 
defendants charged under the MDLEA are eligible for safety-valve relief, 
the D.C. Circuit brought the MDLEA in line with other acts that provide 
uniform sentencing for “drug crimes committed in domestic waters and 
drug crimes committed on the high seas,” such as 21 U.S.C. § 955.93  
 The text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) explicitly states that the section 
applies to three sections of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.94  §§ 
841, 844, 846) and to two sections of the Controlled Substances Import 
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 960 and 963).95 Furthermore, the text of 21 
U.S.C. § 960(a) enumerates six “unlawful acts,” none of which include the 
                                            
 89.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castillo, 2018 WL 4564803 (U.S.) (No. 18-374) 
at 15;  see also Deborah Beim and Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Federal Circuit 
Courts, YALE UNIVERSITY 2-3 (Mar. 19, 2015), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/
documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/EvolutionofConflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF8J-PUNR] 
(“Unless a circuit repudiates its past decision to come in line with other circuits, only the 
Supreme Court can bring uniformity to a body of law when circuits split.”). 
 90.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castillo, 2018 WL 4564803 (U.S.) (No. 18-374) at 
14.  
 91.  See United States v. Anchundia-Espinoza, 897 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2018); Gamboa-
Cardenas, 508 F.3d at 494; Alexander, 713 F. App’x at 928. 
 92.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 295. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2012). 
 95.  Id. 
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provisions of the MDLEA.96 But, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out, the 
penalties for the MDLEA are supplied in § 960(b).97 Additionally, the 
relevant portion of the MDLEA refers to different sentencing provisions 
for “second or subsequent offense[s].”98 Because “second or subsequent 
offense[s]” are punished harshly,99 and expressly provided for in separate 
parts of the United States Code, it is clear that first time offenses under the 
MDLEA are “offenses under” 21 U.S.C. § 960 for purposes of sentencing. 
The defendants in Alexander and Mosquera-Murillo were first-time 
offenders who would have been otherwise eligible for safety-valve 
relief.100  
 The next step, then, is determining whether or not the MDLEA can 
be considered an “offense under § 960” if § 960 only provides the 
sentencing for the MDLEA.101 This is the critical point of divergence 
between the circuits. In United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, the case that 
provided the precedent upon which Alexander was decided, the Eleventh 
Circuit produced a five-page opinion that was limited to the plain-
language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).102 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit 
relied on United States v. Steele to conclude “that when Congress uses 
clear and unambiguous language, ‘that is as far as we go to ascertain its 
intent.’”103 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he 
selection of these five statutes reflects an intent to exclude others.”104 This 
conclusion is where the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have erred. Although 
the language of § 960(a) is unambiguous, whether or not an offense can 
                                            
 96.  § 960 (listing §§ 825, 952, 957, 955, and 959 as acts which prohibit the specific 
offenses which the “safety valve” provisions applies to). 
 97.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 295; 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a) (2018) (“A person 
violating paragraph (1) of section 70503(a) of this title shall be punished as provided in 
section 1010 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 
U.S.C. 960).”).  
 98.  § 70506(a)  (“However, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense as provided 
in section 1012(b) of that Act (21 U.S.C. 962(b)), the person shall be punished as provided 
in section 1012 of that Act (21 U.S.C. 962).”). 
 99.  Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 962(a) (1994) (providing that “Any person convicted of any 
offense under this subchapter is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, 
punishable by a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized . . . .”).  
 100.  Alexander, 713 F.App’x. at 922, 928; Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 289, 292.  
 101.  See generally, Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 294. 
 102.  United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 103.  Id. (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc)).  
 104.  Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 200 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
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qualify as “an offense under” § 960 when the penalty for that offense is 
enumerated in § 960(b) is ambiguous. 
 The D.C. Circuit’s approach to resolving the issue of whether or not 
the MDLEA constitutes an “offense under § 960” addresses head on the 
ambiguity present in the case of first-time MDLEA offenses.105 By 
recognizing the ambiguity created by the interaction of the MDLEA and 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) as well as 21 U.S.C. § 960, the D.C. Circuit was able 
to take the critical first step to resolving the issue correctly. Once the 
ambiguity of the relationship between the aforementioned statutes is 
recognized, courts can look to the legislative intent and statutory 
interpretation as opposed to stopping their analysis at the plain-language 
of the statute. 
 Regarding the legislative intent, the D.C. Circuit noted that “[w]hen 
Congress criminalized opium possession on the high seas in 1914, it set 
the maximum penalty at two years, which at the time was the maximum 
penalty for importing opium into the United States.”106 Moreover, when 
Congress amended the sentences for the two offenses in 1922 and 1951, it 
maintained the sentencing parity.107 Although Congress ultimately 
repealed these statutes when the drug code was “overhauled” in 1970,108 
this is compelling evidence of Congressional intent to punish drug 
offenses committed on the high seas and in domestic waters as equivalent 
for sentencing purposes. Notably, an analysis of the historical and 
legislative history of the sentencing statutes is noticeably absent from the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinions in Alexander and Pertuz-Pertuz.109 In light of 
the complicated interaction of the MDLEA and the related sentencing 
statutes, the Eleventh Circuit erred by not addressing this history in its 
analyses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should consider the legislative 
history and Congressional intent when determining whether first-time 
offenses qualify for safety-valve relief. This will likely lead to the same 
conclusion that the D.C. Circuit reached: first-time offenders of the 
MDLEA are eligible for safety-valve relief.  
 In addition to addressing the legislative intent and history behind the 
drug enforcement statutes, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the complex 
interaction between the MDLEA and the statutes that provide its penalties. 
Of importance to the analysis of whether the MDLEA constitutes “an 
                                            
 105.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 294-95. 
 106.  Id. at 295.  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  United States v. Alexander, 713 F. App’x. 919 (11th Cir. 2017), see generally 
Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d. 
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offense under § 960” is whether § 960 supplies some of the elements that 
comprise the MDLEA. This was correctly addressed by the D.C. Circuit 
but not by the Eleventh.110 “Offenses are defined by the provisions that 
supply their elements.”111 In the case of the MDLEA, the elements of 
penalties are drawn directly from 21 U.S.C. § 960.112 Based on the 
principle identified in Patterson, the MDLEA qualifies as “an offense 
under § 960” because it supplies the penalty elements for the MDLEA.113 
Although the Eleventh Circuit observed that “section 3553(f), refers to an 
‘offense under’ section 960 – not to an ‘offense penalized under’ section 
960 and not to a ‘sentence under 960,’”114 this observation is not 
persuasive for the purposes of defining “an offense under § 960.” Because 
the MDLEA is not complete without the sentencing elements, which are 
provided by § 960(b), a defendant cannot violate the MDLEA without 
violating § 960.115 A violation of MDLEA constitutes a violation of § 
960(b) and thus the MDLEA constitutes “an offense under § 960.”  
Looking at the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), it does not state 
“an offense under § 960(a).” Instead, it merely states “960.”116 Therefore, 
if the MDLEA can constitute an offense under § 960 because § 960(b) 
supplies the penalties for the MDLEA, violations of the MDLEA 
constitute violations of § 960. This observation was the crucial difference 
between the interpretations of the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits.117  
More importantly, however, § 960(b) “supplies the offense elements 
of drug-type and drug-quantity . . . which bear on the degree of culpability 
and determine the statutory sentencing range.”118 Thus, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s insinuation that the MDLEA is merely “an offense penalized 
under § 960”119 is inaccurate. The drug-type and drug-quantity do not just 
bear on the “statutory sentencing range,” these are elements that make a 
defendant’s conduct illegal. The defendants in Mosquera-Murillo and 
Alexander violated § 960(b) as well as the MDLEA; therefore, the 
violations constituted offenses under § 960. 
                                            
 110.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293; Alexander, 713 F. App’x.  
 111.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 
210 (1977)). 
 112.  Id.; see also  § 70503(a)(1). 
 113.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293. 
 114.  Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d at 1329. 
 115.  See Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293. 
 116.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2012). 
 117.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293; see also Alexander, 713 F.App’x. 919 (11th 
Cir. 2017). 
 118.  Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293.  
 119.  Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d at 1329. 
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IV. THE FIRST STEP ACT 
 Recent legislation passed the House of Representatives may have 
implications on the “safety valve” provision.120 The legislation, known as 
the FIRST STEP Act,121 includes a number of changes that impact the 
length of sentences.122 The Act, as amended by the Senate, includes 
reforms that would allow judges to “have greater freedom to use so-called 
safety valves to sidestep mandatory minimums in some cases.”123 
Although the Act has substantial backing in both the Senate and the White 
House,124 the impact of the changes cannot be assessed until the legislation 
has become finalized and signed into law. However, at the very least, the 
Congressional support for broadening the reach of “safety-valves” to 
sidestep mandatory minimums in the cases of nonviolent drug offenders 
may be viewed as support for the interpretation of the legislative intent 
taken by the D.C. Circuit in Mosquera-Murillo. Viewed in this light, the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Mosquera-Murillo arguably brings current 
jurisprudence on the “safety-valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) 
squarely in line with what Congress intended.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split results in disparate sentencing for defendants 
based on geography. Denying “safety-valve” relief to defendants 
sentenced under the MDLEA creates a sentencing scheme that departs 
from Congress’ century-long practice of sentencing parity for defendants 
apprehended on the high seas and those who conducted their illicit 
activities in domestic waters. Although there is a need for harsh penalties 
for international drug traffickers, the language of the MDLEA does not 
support denying safety-valve relief for those who violate it. The policy 
concerns for imposing harsher sentences on international as opposed to 
domestic drug traffickers is a debate that is beyond the scope of this case 
note; however, regardless of the policy rationale, denying safety-valve 
relief to otherwise eligible defendants is not supported by either the text of 
the statute or the legislative intent.  
                                            
 120.  Nicholas Fandos & Maggie Haberman, Trump Embraces a Path to Revise U.S. 
Sentencing and Prison Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/14/us/politics/prison-sentencing-trump.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc
/8LKV-YQT6]. 
 121.  FIRST STEP Act, HR. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018).  
 122.  Fandos & Haberman, supra note 120. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
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Based on these factors, the Supreme Court should grant the petition 
for certiorari and resolve the circuit split to ensure uniformity in federal 
sentencing. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should look to the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation and hold that otherwise eligible 
defendants are entitled to safety-valve relief as the statute is currently 
written. The Supreme Court should recognize that 21 U.S.C. § 960 not 
only supplies the penalties for first-time offenders of MDLEA but also the 
drug-type and quantity which impact the statutory sentencing scheme. 
These facts support the D.C. Circuit’s position that the MDLEA is “an 
offense under § 960” and renders applicable defendants eligible for safety-
valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should overturn the precedent set by 
the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that defendants charged 
under the MDLEA are entitled to safety-valve relief as a matter of law.  
